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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Brian Calder Kerr appeals from the district court’s ruling affirming the 
magistrate’s judgment. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Kerr shot an elk while hunting and trespassed onto private property in 
order to retrieve it.  (R., pp. 35-36.)  He was cited for the misdemeanor charge of 
trespassing on private property to retrieve wildlife.  (R., p. 4.) 
Kerr entered a guilty plea as part of a settlement agreement with the state.  
(R., pp. 5-7.)  The parties appeared to agree on Kerr’s sentence as spelled out in 
the plea agreement; however, they disputed a term of the sentence that “fish and 
game will confiscate the bull elk.”  (Compare R., p. 7 with R., pp.  8-11.)  At 
sentencing, the state presented evidence and argued the elk should be 
confiscated by the state.  (See R., pp. 8-9, 18.)  Kerr, on the other hand, “argued 
that he ought to be able to keep the elk despite his trespass”  and that the 
confiscation statute “was inapplicable to his case.”  (R., pp. 9-11, 17.)  The 
magistrate imposed the sentence and ordered the confiscation, but allowed a 
subsequent “motion to reconsider” the confiscation issue.  (R., pp. 11-12.)  Kerr 
filed supplemental briefing and noticed a hearing on the matter.  (See R., p. 2.) 
The magistrate issued a memorandum decision resolving the confiscation 
issue.  (R., pp. 17-23.)  The magistrate’s findings, adopted and relied on by the 
state on appeal, included the following: 
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There is no question that Kerr trespassed onto another person’s 
property, which was cultivated land, in order to retrieve a bull elk 
that had been shot. Those facts are not in dispute because that is 
what Kerr was charged with and to which he pled guilty. 
… 
…To the extent Kerr asks this Court to accept his version that he 
shot the elk lawfully, this Court declines to make that factual 
finding. Likewise, to the extent the State asks this Court to look at 
the evidence presented at sentencing and make a factual finding 
that he shot the elk while in the act of trespassing, this Court 
declines to make that factual finding.[1] 
 
What the Court finds factually is that Kerr shot a bull elk which died 
on someone’s private property. Kerr trespassed onto that property 
to retrieve the elk. The issue thus becomes: does [the confiscation 
statute] apply to these facts? 
 
(R., pp. 18-19.) 
 
  
 
 
 
                                            
1 Kerr takes for granted on appeal that it is an “incontrovertible fact that Kerr had 
already lawfully ‘taken’ the animal” prior to trespassing.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 15;  
see also Appellant’s brief, pp. 13 (“Here, that after Kerr had lawfully taken and 
possessed an elk…”), 14 (“Here, Kerr pled guilty to trespassing for the purpose 
of retrieving wildlife (an elk) that, pursuant to the plain language of the statute, he 
had already lawfully taken.”), 17 (“Significantly, the magistrate court indirectly 
recognized the problem of creating the impossible circumstance of two ‘takings’ 
and the question of whether Kerr could ‘unlawfully take’ an animal that he had 
already ‘lawfully taken’….”).)  However, the magistrate expressly declined to 
make that factual finding.  (R., pp. 18-19.)  The state contends, as the magistrate 
and district court apparently found, that the issues on appeal can be resolved 
without finding whether Kerr lawfully possessed the elk prior to the trespass.  
(See R., pp. 20, 38-39.)  However, if this Court determines this fact is relevant, 
the proper remedy would be a remand for the magistrate to make a finding as to 
whether Kerr initially lawfully took the elk, as opposed to reversing the 
confiscation order based on a factual finding that the magistrate specifically 
declined to make. 
  3 
 The magistrate determined that the confiscation statute would apply to 
these facts, because if the elk “was unlawfully taken by Kerr then it is subject to 
confiscation,” and here “Kerr’s action in trespassing was for the sole purpose of 
possessing an elk that he had shot.”  (R., pp 19-20.)  In other words, “Kerr 
trespassed (went onto someone else’s property unlawfully) in order to possess 
(take) an elk,” and “[t]herefore, the elk was ‘unlawfully taken’ by Kerr while he 
was actively trespassing,” subjecting the elk to confiscation.  (R., p. 20.) 
 Kerr appealed to the district court, arguing the magistrate misapplied the 
statute, and for the first time argued that Idaho Code § 36-1304(b) is  
“unconstitutionally vague and unenforceable as to the Defendant.”  (R., pp. 24-
25.)   
In its Order Establishing Appellate Procedure the district court found “this 
appeal involves only a question of law,” namely, “whether, under I.C. § 36-
1304(b), an elk was ‘taken unlawfully’ by the defendant or was ‘unlawfully in the 
[defendant’s] possession’ where the defendant lawfully shot the elk while it was 
on private land, but before dying the elk moved onto private land, upon which the 
defendant unlawfully trespassed to retrieve it.”  (R., p. 27.)  The district court also 
noted the previously unpresented void-for-vagueness issue, and indicated it 
would not consider it on appeal unless Kerr sought reconsideration of the Order 
Establishing Appellate Procedure and contended “he raised the issue before [the 
magistrate], or that the issue for some reason may be raised for the first time on 
appeal.”  (R., p. 27, n. 1.) 
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Following a hearing on the intermediate appeal (R., pp. 32-34), the district 
court affirmed the magistrate’s order (R., pp. 35-48).  The district court noted that 
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 36-1304(b)(i) “Fish and Game may confiscate 
any wildlife ‘taken unlawfully.’”  (R., p. 37.)  The district court also pointed out that 
“[i]n this context, ‘take’ means, among other things, ‘hunt, pursue, … shoot, 
…kill, or possess or any attempt to do so.’”  (R., p. 37 (emphasis and ellipses in 
original, quoting I.C. § 36-202(i).)  The district court accordingly concluded that: 
It follows that Fish and Game may confiscate an elk from a hunter 
who unlawfully hunted it, unlawfully pursued it, unlawfully shot it, 
unlawfully killed it, or unlawfully possessed it, or who unlawfully 
attempted to do any of those things. The hunter might have done 
one or more of those things lawfully, but doing any one of them 
unlawfully subjects him to confiscation of his kill. By his own 
admission, Kerr acted unlawfully in gaining possession of the elk 
he shot. That is the bottom-line reason the magistrate’s decision 
was correct and Kerr’s appeal fails. 
 
(R., p. 38 (emphasis in original).) 
While finding “the case is straightforward enough that the Court could end 
its analysis there,” the district court nevertheless addressed the rest of Kerr’s 
arguments in detail.  (R., p. 38.)  Regarding Kerr’s contention that he initially shot 
the elk lawfully on public land, the court noted that the magistrate made no 
factual finding as to whether Kerr did so.  (R., p. 38.)  The district court instead 
concluded the magistrate took the fact of an initial lawful shooting “as a given” for 
the purposes of a legal analysis, because “[i]t didn’t matter whether Kerr shot the 
elk lawfully” when “after shooting it he proceeded to possess it unlawfully.”  (R., 
p. 38.)  “Thus,” the court found, “even assuming he shot the elk lawfully, he 
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unlawfully possessed it, triggering Fish and Game’s confiscation right under 
section 36-1304(b)(i).”  (R., p. 38 (emphasis in original).)   
The district court also found there were two procedural bars to raising a 
void-for-vagueness claim on intermediate appeal: first, Kerr did not raise the 
issue to the magistrate, and second, Kerr failed to argue that the alleged error 
was “fundamental error” until his reply brief, preventing the state from briefing the 
issue in its response.  (R., pp. 40-41.)  The district court further concluded that 
even if the void-for-vagueness claim was not procedurally barred it failed on the 
merits.  (R., p. 42.)  The district court accordingly affirmed the magistrate’s 
decision upholding the confiscation order.  (R., p. 42.) 
Kerr timely appealed.  (R., pp. 44-46.) 
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ISSUES 
 
Kerr states the issues on appeal as: 
 
I. Is Idaho Code § 36-1304(b), read together with the definition 
provided in Idaho Code § 36-202(i), unconstitutionally vague and 
unenforceable? 
 
II. Did the Magistrate Court misapply Idaho Code § 36-1304(b), where 
there was no finding that the Appellant took game illegally (or 
illegally possessed game) prior to the trespass? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
I. Has Kerr failed to show the district court erred in affirming the magistrate’s 
denial of Kerr’s motion to reconsider the judgment?  
 
II. Has Kerr failed to show it was fundamental error for the magistrate to not 
sua sponte rule Idaho Code § 36-1304 unconstitutional? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
Kerr Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Affirming The Magistrate’s 
Denial Of Kerr’s Motion To Reconsider The Judgment 
 
A. Introduction 
 Kerr argues the magistrate and district court misapplied Idaho Code 
Sections 36-1304(b) and 36-202.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-20.)  This argument 
fails because the undisputed evidence before the magistrate was that Kerr 
unlawfully trespassed while retrieving the elk at issue.  Per the plain language of 
the statutes, that constituted an unlawful taking and subjected the elk to 
confiscation by the department of Fish and Game.  The district court therefore 
correctly affirmed the magistrate’s denial of Kerr’s motion to reconsider the 
confiscation order. 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
This Court “directly reviews the district court’s decision” when the district 
court acts in its intermediate appellate capacity.  In re Doe, 147 Idaho 243, 248, 
207 P.3d 974, 979 (2009) (citing State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 
215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008); Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 
(2008)).  This Court reviews the magistrate record “to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings.”  In 
re Doe, 147 Idaho at 248, 207 P.3d at 979.  “If those findings are so supported 
and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the 
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magistrate’s decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] the district court’s decision as 
a matter of procedure.”  Id. 
C. Because Kerr Indisputably Unlawfully Trespassed When He Took The 
Elk, The Plain Language Of The Statutes Subjected The Elk To 
Confiscation 
 
An Idaho Fish and Game official “may at any time seize and take into his 
custody any wildlife or any portion thereof which may have been taken 
unlawfully, or which may be unlawfully in the possession of any person.”  I.C. 
§ 36-1304(b)(i).  If the evidence before a magistrate shows “said wildlife was 
unlawfully taken,” the magistrate shall order “the same confiscated or sold by the 
director.”  I.C. § 36-1304(b)(i)(1). 
The meaning of “take,” as used above, can be found in Idaho Code 36-
202, which provides definitions for “[w]henever the following words appear in title 
36.”  “Take,” so defined, means to “hunt, pursue, catch, capture, shoot, fish, 
seine, trap, kill, or possess or any attempt to do so.”  I.C. § 36-202(i).  Because 
disjunctives such as “or” introduce alternatives (State v. Herren, 157 Idaho 722, 
726, 339 P.3d 1126, 1130 (2014)), one can take wildlife by shooting it, or killing 
it, or possessing it, or attempting to possess it. 
Here, Kerr pleaded guilty (R., pp. 5, 7) to “enter[ing] the real property of 
another … for the purposes of … retrieving wildlife … without the permission of 
the owner.”  I.C. § 36-1603(a).  (See also, R., p. 4.)  “Retrieving” or “attempting to 
retrieve” something is synonymous with possession or attempted possession, 
and here Kerr possessed or attempted to possess the elk while actively 
unlawfully trespassing on cultivated private property.  (See R., pp. 4-5, 19.)  The 
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magistrate therefore had more than enough evidence to determine that Kerr 
unlawfully took the elk, thus subjecting the elk to confiscation. 
Kerr’s arguments against this inevitable conclusion are unavailing.  The 
core of Kerr’s claim is that because he already lawfully took the elk prior to 
trespassing, a second, post-trespass taking of “something already taken” 
constitutes “impossible physics.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5, 13-16.)  Kerr 
characterizes the magistrate’s application of Sections 36-1404 and 36-202 to 
these facts as “creating the impossible circumstance of two ‘takings’ and the 
question of whether Kerr could ‘unlawfully take’ and animal that had already 
been ‘lawfully taken.’”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)  Kerr therefore argues the 
magistrate misapplied the law when it “reasoned that the physical impossibility of 
two takings did not matter,” and concluded Kerr could have taken the elk both by 
shooting it and by possessing it.2  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5, 19-20.) 
 This argument fails because “[l]egislative definitions of terms included 
within a statute control and dictate the meaning of those terms as used in the 
statute.”  State v. Hartzell, 155 Idaho 107, 110, 305 P.3d 551, 554 (Ct. App. 
2013).  Title 36 specifically defines a taking as something that can be done via 
                                            
2 Kerr also claims, alternatively, that the magistrate erred by not concluding that 
the initial shooting and killing of the elk was a taking.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 18.)  
But this claim is belied by the magistrate’s statement that “[u]nder the broad 
definition of “take” it is also true that Kerr did a taking when he shot or killed the 
elk.”  (R., p. 20.)  Far from concluding that the shooting was not a taking, the 
magistrate simply concluded that “[t]he fact that he took the elk by shooting it 
(perhaps prior to trespassing if his account is to be believed) does nothing to 
diminish or wash away the taint of the taking Kerr engaged in when he 
trespassed to possess the elk.”  (R., p. 20.)  Thus, Kerr fails to show that the 
magistrate found that the shooting was not a taking, much less that such a 
finding would be reversible error. 
  10 
multiple non-exclusive acts.  I.C. § 36-202(i).  One could shoot an animal, pursue 
it, hurt it, kill it, catch it, possess it, or attempt to do any of the above, and by 
performing each separate act a person would “take” the animal as defined by the 
statute.  Id.  The statute places no explicit or implicit limits on the amount of 
times one may take an animal.  See id.  It is clearly physically possible to both 
shoot something, and later possess it, as Kerr did here—and given the statutory 
definition of “take” both of these acts would be takings. 
Kerr appears to be applying a non-statutory definition of “take” when he 
claims something cannot be taken more than once.  But statutory definitions 
control: the law routinely defines non-human corporations as “persons” (see, 
e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1), non-possession as “constructive possession” (see, e.g., 
Henderson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1780, 1784 (2015)), and the impact of 
land-use regulations as “takings” (see, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 
505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992)), to name just a few.  Challenging these legal 
definitions in a court of law for “physical impossibility” would be as nonsensical 
as enjoining chemical processes in a laboratory for legal reasons.  In any event, 
Kerr fails to show that “physical impossibility” has any bearing on statutory 
interpretation, much less that taking wildlife multiple times through different acts 
is impossible, or that the statutory definition of “take” was incorrectly applied 
here.  
Because the taking by possession occurred while Kerr was indisputably 
unlawfully trespassing, he unlawfully took the elk and subjected it to confiscation.  
The magistrate correctly applied the law to the facts when it arrived at this same 
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conclusion, and this Court should therefore affirm the district court as a matter of 
course. 
II. 
Kerr Has Failed To Show It Was Fundamental Error For The Magistrate To Not 
Sua Sponte Rule Idaho Code Sections 36-1304 and 36-202 Unconstitutional 
 
A. Introduction 
Kerr argues that Idaho Code Sections 36-1304 and 36-202 are void for 
vagueness.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-16.)  Covering familiar ground, Kerr 
contends that “it is simply not reasonable for him to believe that he could be 
penalized for what would have to be a second ‘taking,’” and therefore “the statute 
is ambiguous and fails to provide notice.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.) 
But because Kerr never argued the statute was unconstitutional before 
the magistrate, he must show that it was fundamental error for the magistrate to 
not sua sponte rule the statute unconstitutional.  Moreover, Kerr waived his 
fundamental error argument by not raising it to the district court in his opening 
briefing, and fails to challenge that finding on appeal.  Lastly, should his claim be 
preserved, Kerr still fails to show the district court erred by ruling in the 
alternative and dismissing his constitutional claim on the merits. 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged the appellate court 
reviews it de novo.  State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 
(2003).  The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute must overcome 
a strong presumption of constitutionality.  Id.  The appellate court is obligated to 
seek a construction of a statute that upholds its constitutionality.  Id. 
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C. It Was Not Fundamental Error For The Magistrate To Not Sua Sponte 
Rule Idaho Code Sections 36-1304 and 36-202 Unconstitutional 
 
“Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, 
and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to 
the lower court.”  State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, No. 44443, 2017 WL 2569786, at *3 
(Idaho, June 14, 2017) (citing Heckman Ranches, Inc. v. State, By & Through 
Dep’t of Pub. Lands, 99 Idaho 793, 799–800, 589 P.2d 540, 546–47 (1979); 
Marchbanks v. Roll, 142 Idaho 117, 119, 124 P.3d 993, 995 (2005); Frasier v. 
Carter, 92 Idaho 79, 82, 437 P.2d 32, 35 (1968)) (“We have held generally that 
this court will not review issues not presented in the trial court, and that parties 
will be held to the theory on which the cause was tried.”).  A well-settled 
exception to this doctrine is that appellate courts may “consider a claim of error 
to which no objection was made below if the issue presented rises to the level of 
fundamental error.”  State v. Pentico, 151 Idaho 906, 912, 265 P.3d 519, 525 
(Ct. App. 2011). 
Here, a review of the record shows that Kerr did not present an argument 
to the magistrate that the statute was void for vagueness or otherwise 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied to him.3  (See R., pp. 8-11.)  The 
magistrate accordingly never ruled on the question.  (See R., pp. 17-22; State v. 
Pickens, 148 Idaho 554, 557, 224 P.3d 1143, 1146 (Ct. App. 2010) (“In order for 
                                            
3 The state’s review of Kerr’s claims below is limited to the record Kerr has 
supplied on appeal, which contains no transcripts, none of Kerr’s briefing to the 
magistrate in support of his motion, and none of the parties’ briefing to the district 
court.  (See generally, R.) “In the absence of an adequate record on appeal to 
support the appellant's claims, we will not presume error.”  State v. Tregeagle, 
161 Idaho 763, ___, 391 P.3d 21, 26 (Ct. App. 2017). 
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an issue to be raised on appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling that 
forms the basis for the assignment of error.”) (citations omitted).) 
Kerr disagrees on appeal, arguing that he presented a void-for-vagueness 
claim to the magistrate: 
Directly stated, Kerr asserts that the district court is mistaken and 
directs this Court to the language of the May 31, 2016 
Memorandum Decision. Indeed the magistrate court acknowledged 
that “Kerr’s other argument” was whether “the Legislature did not 
specifically detail the application of I.C. § 36-1304(b)….” (See R., 
p.21 (Memorandum Decision, p. 5).) Whether the Idaho Legislature 
erred by not providing specific detail for the application of Idaho 
Code § 36-1304(b) is a void for vagueness argument. Accordingly, 
the issue was raised below, and the district court’s determination 
that the issue was not raised below is without basis. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11.)  Putting aside the issue of whether the magistrate’s 
paraphrase of a party’s claim is proof the party itself raised an issue below, this 
partial quote of the magistrate fails to show Kerr raised a void-for-vagueness 
claim.  Indeed, scrutinizing the entire passage shows that the magistrate was 
only responding to Kerr’s argument regarding the application of one statute to 
another: 
Kerr then reasons that I.C. § 36-1304(b) was only intended to apply 
to convictions of specific crimes of “illegal taking” or “illegal 
possession.” Kerr also argues that because the Legislature did 
not detail the application of the confiscation statute to the 
trespassing statute that the Legislature did not intend for it to 
apply. 
 
Contrary to Kerr’s narrow reading, I.C. § 36-1304(b) is not tied to or 
limited to convictions of particular offenses. By its plain language, 
I.C. § 1304(b) is a statute of broad applicability across the 
spectrum of Fish and Game cases. It is a statute unrelated to 
penalties – rather, it provides the authority for the Department of 
Fish and Game to dispose of wildlife. Presumably, the rationale is 
that those who violate the law while hunting, fishing, trapping, etc. 
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ought not to profit from or get to keep the fruits of their illegal 
activity. 
 
Kerr’s other argument that the Legislature did not specially 
detail the application of I.C. § 36-1304(b) helps make the point. 
The Legislature did not detail the application of I.C. § 36-
1304(b) to any particular section of the code. That is, of course, 
because it is generally applicable whenever unlawfully taken 
wildlife is involved. 
 
(R., p. 21 (italic emphasis in original, boldface emphasis added).)  In other 
words, simply because the magistrate used the word “detail” in dispatching Kerr’s 
statutory application argument, does not mean that Kerr argued the statute was 
void for vagueness or otherwise unconstitutional below.  Because Kerr did not 
present a void-for-vagueness argument to the magistrate he must show the 
magistrate committed fundamental error by not sua sponte ruling the statute 
unconstitutional. 
 As a separate procedural matter, Kerr waived his fundamental error claim 
below by waiting until his reply brief to raise it.4  (R., p. 41 (noting that on 
intermediate appeal “Kerr waited until filling his reply brief to begin arguing that 
this alleged error is ‘fundamental error’”).)  The district court ruled that this was 
too late to consider the issue: 
Kerr faces two procedural bars, one for waiting until appeal to raise 
his void-for-vagueness argument and the other for waiting until his 
reply brief on appeal to characterize as “fundamental error” the 
magistrate’s failure to sua sponte find the confiscation statute 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. 
 
                                            
4 Here too, the state’s review of the claims Kerr brought below is limited to the 
record Kerr has supplied on appeal, which does not include his opening briefing 
to the district court, but does include the district court’s ruling on his intermediate 
appeal.  (See R., pp. 40-41.) 
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There is no good reason Kerr should be permitted to avoid the 
effect of the latter of those two procedural bars. In its order 
establishing the procedures for this appeal, the Court expressly 
noted Kerr’s failure to raise his void-for-vagueness argument 
before the magistrate and his consequent inability to assert that 
issue on appeal. Thus, Kerr was on notice before the briefing 
schedule began that the Court regard the void-for-vagueness issue 
as untimely. If he wished to pursue that issue anyway, he should’ve 
argued in his opening brief that the “fundamental error” doctrine 
permits him to do so. His failure to make that argument at the 
appropriate time prevented the State from briefing whether alleged 
error is reviewable as “fundamental error.” The latter procedural bar 
therefore thus eliminates the need to address whether Kerr can 
avoid the effect of the former procedural bar by characterizing the 
alleged error as “fundamental error.” 
 
(R., p. 41 (citing Gordon v. Hedrick, 159 Idaho 604, 612, 364 P.3d 951, 959 
(2015)).   
On appeal, Kerr has failed to address the fact that he waited until his reply 
brief to raise fundamental error claim, much less does he claim that the district 
court’s preservation ruling was incorrect.  (See Appellant’s brief pp. 10-12 
(addressing whether Kerr raised the argument before the magistrate, but not 
whether Kerr raised the issue to the district court prior to his reply briefing).)  To 
preserve arguments on appeal parties must raise issues in their opening briefs.  
Patterson v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 321, 256 P.3d 718, 
729 (2011) (“In order to be considered by this Court, the appellant is required to 
identify legal issues and provide authorities supporting the arguments in the 
opening brief.”)  Because Kerr neglected to raise the fundamental error claim in 
his opening brief on intermediate appeal—and likewise fails to challenge the 
district court’s preservation ruling in his opening brief on direct appeal—he has 
  16 
waived a challenge to the district court’s ruling that he failed to preserve his 
fundamental error claim by not raising it in his opening brief. 
Turning to the merits, assuming arguendo Kerr has preserved his claim, 
fundamental error is an error that “so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces 
manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his fundamental right to due 
process.”  State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992).  In order 
to constitute fundamental error the defendant must show that the error: 
“(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; 
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was 
a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.”  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010).  Kerr cannot show fundamental error because he 
cannot show that his constitutional rights were violated, much less clearly so. 
1. Idaho Code Sections 36-1304 and 36-202 Do Not Violate Kerr’s 
Unwaived Constitutional Rights, As They Are Not Void For 
Vagueness 
 
Idaho Code Sections 36-1304 and 36-202 are not void for vagueness.  
“[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the 
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand 
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement.”  State v. Knutsen, 158 Idaho 199, 202, 
345 P.3d 989, 992 (2015) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 
(1983)).  “[T]he more important aspect of vagueness doctrine ‘is not actual 
notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine—the requirement that a 
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legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.’”  Id. (quoting 
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358). 
As a constitutional matter “[a] conviction or punishment fails to comply 
with due process if the statute or regulation under which it is obtained ‘fails to 
provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so 
standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory 
enforcement.’”  F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012) 
(quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).  Accordingly, “the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine addresses concerns about (1) fair notice and 
(2) arbitrary and discriminatory prosecutions.”  Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 
358, 412 (2010) (citing Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357).  But the doctrine also grants 
statutes a “strong presumption” of validity and the court must, if possible, 
“construe, not condemn” them.  See id. at 402-403 (internal quotes and citations 
omitted).  Even if a statute’s “outermost boundaries” are “imprecise” that fact has 
little relevance where “appellant’s conduct falls squarely within the ‘hard core’ of 
the statute’s proscriptions.”  Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608 (1973); 
see also Skilling, 561 U.S. at 412 (citing Broadrick).   
 Here, Idaho Code Sections 36-1304 and 36-202 are not void for 
vagueness, either on their face or as applied to Kerr.  As explained above, 
Section 36-1304 provides that unlawfully taken wildlife may be seized by the 
department of Fish and Game.  I.C. § 36-1304(b).  Further, Section 36-202 
explicitly defines “take” and expressly applies that definition to the entirety of Title 
36.  I.C. § 36-202(i).  Unlawfully taking wildlife, as defined in Section 36-202, 
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accordingly subjects that wildlife to confiscation per Section 36-1304(b).  Far 
from being vague in any meaningful sense, the statute places persons of 
ordinary intelligence on notice that if they unlawfully take wildlife, as defined by 
the Code, that wildlife is subject to confiscation. 
 Kerr argues otherwise, contending again that “where the statute makes 
clear that Kerr lawfully ‘took’ the elk when he shot and killed the elk, it is simply 
not reasonable to believe that Kerr had the requisite notice to believe he, or 
anyone else that lawfully harvests an animal that unfortunately happened to die 
on private property, would be subject to confiscation if they trespassed to get to 
the animal and pled guilty to a trespass.”  (R., p. 14.)  This reconstruction of the 
facts, however, glosses over the fundamental point: regardless of Kerr’s actions 
prior to the trespass, when Kerr “trespassed to get to the animal” he necessarily 
did so unlawfully.  I.C. § 36-1603(a).  Moreover, “trespassing to get to” an 
animal, followed by possessing that animal while trespassing, falls under at least 
two of the unmistakable statutory definitions of takings.  I.C. § 36-202(i).  
Because Kerr possessed or attempted to possess the elk while trespassing he 
necessarily unlawfully took it, and subjected it to confiscation.  I.C. § 36-1304(b).  
Kerr was therefore reasonably on notice of the statute’s plain meaning, and its 
plain application to him. 
Kerr also fails to show Idaho Code Section 36-1304(b) is void for 
vagueness because it “allows for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”  
(See Appellant’s brief, p. 16.)  Where statutory language “is sufficiently clear,” 
“the speculative danger of arbitrary enforcement does not render the ordinance 
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void for vagueness.”  Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 
455 U.S. 489, 503 (1982).  Here, the language is perfectly clear: if a person 
unlawfully takes wildlife then the wildlife is subject to confiscation.  Because this 
language is clear, any speculative danger of arbitrary enforcement does not 
render the statute void for vagueness. 
Kerr disagrees, protesting that the “very language” of the statutes would 
lead to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement: “any wrongful act, regardless of 
how minor, committed by any individual involved in the activity of hunting or 
trapping, would subject the malfeasor in possession of a legally harvested animal 
subject to confiscation.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 16.)  But this hypothetical worst-
case scenario flows from a flawed reading of the statute; it incorrectly assumes 
that “any wrongful act,” as opposed to unlawful acts, would trigger the 
confiscation statute.  It also ignores that the hunter must have unlawfully taken 
the wildlife as a predicate act.  When read correctly the statutes do not subject 
lawfully taken wildlife to confiscation for unrelated minor wrongdoings; they only 
subject unlawfully taken wildlife to confiscation.  Or in other words, as stated by 
the magistrate, the common-sense effect of the statute is that “those who violate 
the law while hunting, fishing, trapping, etc. ought not to profit from or get to keep 
the fruits of their illegal activity.”  (R., p. 21.)  Kerr may disagree with the wisdom 
of this as a policy matter, but he has not shown that the statutes themselves 
allow for arbitrary enforcement or are otherwise void for vagueness. 
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Idaho Code Sections 36-1304 and 36-202 are not void for vagueness, 
and Kerr has accordingly failed to establish the first prong of the fundamental 
error analysis. 
 2. The Error Is Not Clear From The Record 
 Kerr has also failed to show that any error is clear from the record.  An 
error plainly exists if the error is clear from the record and there is not any need 
for additional information, including information as to whether the failure to object 
was a tactical decision.  See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.  On 
appeal, Kerr summarily contends that “the claim of error is clear without the need 
for reference to any additional information not contained in the appellate record.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)  But because Kerr has failed to show a constitutional 
violation in the first place, Kerr fails this prong of the fundamental error analysis 
for the same reason he failed the first prong.  Even if there was error for the 
district court to not sua sponte rule Idaho Code Sections 36-1304 and 36-202 
unconstitutional, that error is not clear from the record.  The argument provided 
by Kerr regarding “clear error” has failed to establish any error was clear from the 
record. 
 Kerr has failed to show fundamental error. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s 
decision to affirm the magistrate’s denial of Kerr’s motion to reconsider the 
judgment. 
 DATED this 1st day of August, 2017. 
 
       
 _/s/ Kale D. Gans____________ 
 KALE D. GANS 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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